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STATEMENT 
Although the brief heretofore filed in the Net Pro-
ceeds Tax cases (United States Smelting Refining and 
Mining Company vs. Phares Haynes, No. 6931 and 
Combined Metals Reduction Company vs. Tooele County, 
No. 6907) was designed to answer the arguments ad-
vanced by counsel in support of their petition for re-
hearing in the instant cases, in order to make the record 
complete and assist the court in analyzing the matters 
advanced by Respondents herein the following Brief is 
submitted. Since the general problem has been presented 
heretofore, we shall confine our remarks specifically to 
answering the several arguments, upon which Respond-
ents rely as requiring a rehearing in the instant matters. 
Those arguments are presented to the Court in the Peti-
tion for Rehearing under seven separate points, which 
we proceed to discuss in the order presented by Re-
spondents. 
ARG Ul\1EN11 
I 
The first alleged error consists of the Court's fail-
ure "to distinguish between premium payments made on 
custom ores which had been sold and premium payments 
made on ores produced but not sold.'' The fallacy of 
this argument is twofold: First, it presupposes that pre-
mium payments were made on ores which were never 
sold-which is not the fact. It is true, as set forth in 
the Record, that premium payments in some instances 
were made before sale and some times after sale, as a 
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matter of time. But in all cases there was a sale of the 
ores in question. The stipulation reads as follows: 
"19. In certain instances premium payments 
are made in advance of a sale of ores or the metals 
recovered from ores; in other instances such pay-
ments are made after sale of the ores." (R p. 
54). 
The affidavit executed by each mining company as 
a basis for payment of the premiums provides that the 
ore specified was ''produced and delivered for sale'' 
during the month in question. -While l\Ietals Reserve 
Company was willing, based on the producer's affidavit, 
to pay the premium in advance of the sale, it was not will-
ing to pay for ore which never reached the processing or 
reduction plant in the cycle which finally resulted in a 
finished product for consumption. 
Second, Counsel criticize the court for not disting-
uishing between custom ores and other ores, when there 
is nothing in the record which justifies or permits a dis-
tinction to be made between these two methods of ore 
production. All that is contained in the record is that 
with respect to Kennecott Copper Corporation and the 
United States Smelting Refining and l\Iining Company, 
premium payments are made ''on the basis of the de-
termined metal content of the precipitates an1l concen-
trates delivered to American Smelting and Refining Com-
pany" and "on the basis of monthly affidavits showing 
the production according to the Company's records" 
approximate!~, :--lO to 90 days hefore the orcs are sold; 
whil1~ with independent or custom shippers, premium 
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payments are made at the end of the month in which 
the ores are produced and sold to the smelter or re-
duction works. ( R. p. 54, 55). Since the only difference 
or distinction as shown by the record is in the time of 
payment of the premium (either prior or subsequent to 
the actual sale), we do not see how the court would have 
been justified in analyzing the two methods separately. 
And certainly there is no distinction between the basis 
for payment of the premiums on custom orcs and ores 
produced and partially refined before sale. 
At no time heretofore have counsel for Respondents 
attempted to differentiate between the two methods of 
production. They have at all times maintained that all of 
the mining companies fall in the same category-the 
joint trial, stipulation of facts, record on appeal, and the 
briefs filed in connection therewith reflect that position. 
Certainly, now is not the time to say that the Court 
erred because it did not do what no one has argued should 
be done-prior to the Petition for Rehearing. 
On page 7 of their brief, Respondents argue that 
''premium payments were made upon the basis of af-
fidavits showing the production and delivery to a smelter 
and not upon a sale, even in the case of custom ores.'' 
The same argument might be made with respect to many 
business transactions today, where payment for goods 
is made upon the basis of bills of lading, invoices, ware-
house receipts or other evidences that certain goods have 
been produced and appropriated to the usc of the Buyer. 
Here the ores must have been produced and delivered to 
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the smelter or reduction works "for sale" as set forth 
in the affidavit. In other words, delivered to the chan-
nels where the \V ar Allocations Boanl then had exclu-
sive power to control the metal and determine its further 
process either into shells, tanks, ships, guns, or other 
materials essential to the war effort. 
Again couniiel urge that because premium payments 
arc based on the material paid for where settlement con-
tracts exist, while fixed percentages are used where no 
settlement contract exists (Brief page 6) the court was 
in error in holding that "metals are not paid for under 
settlement contracts unless such mdals are sold." The 
court's remark quoted was limited to transactions \Yhere 
settlement contracts did exist and merely illustrated that 
in all such instances the ore had actually been sold and 
the contract under which it was sold was use<l by the 
government in determining the metal content of the 
ore on which it paid the premium. However, the settle-
ment contract itself may not have accurately reflected 
the exact metal content of the ore sold any more than 
the fixed percentages of 93, 90, and 85 percent of the 
metal content in the case of copper, lead and r,inc re-
spectively, used by the government where no settlement 
contract existed. The indicated percentages merely took 
the place of the percentages which were used in the 
settlement contracts-and which might have differed 
for each producer, depending upon its ability to com-
mand a favorable settlement contract with the smelter 
or reduction works. 
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In all cases the premiums were paid for rnetals con-· 
tained in the ore. That was what the government needed 
to expedite the War effort. And in order to get more 
metal each producer was guaranteed 17 cents per pound 
for its copper, nine and one-fourth cents per pound for 
its lead, and eleven cents per pound for its zinc over 
and above the quota established for e.ach metal as to 
each producer. This plan has been accurately described 
as being a ''differential pricing technique.'' (See the 
Senate Sub-Committee Preliminary Report as found in 
the Appendix to the brief of Amici Curiae filed herein). 
That designation alone is sufficient to justify this Court 
in holding the premium payments to be a part of the price 
received by the mining companies for their ore produc-
tion. 
However, the Federal Government further recog-
nized the ''Premium Price Plan'' as an integral part 
of its "pricing structure" when it adopted "Supple-
mentary Regulation No. 4 to General l\laximum Price 
Regulation-Exceptions." As therein contained" deliver-
ies of metallic copper, lead, or zinc, or of ores or con-
centrates containing copper, lead or zinc * * * pursuant 
to the premium price plan announced hy the Federal 
Loan Agency, the \Var Production Board, and the Office 
of Price Administration" were exempted from the G en-
oral l\laximum Price Regulation. In other worch;, the 
Federal government recognized the right of each pm-
ducer to receive more than the ceiling price for its ores 
under the premium price plan. Appellants seek only to 
re('1uire each producer to pay an occupation tax based 
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~ 
on the "gross amount" it received - from whatever 
source-from its ores. 
II 
As their second ground for seeking a rehearing, 
Respondents refer to parts of the stipulated facts where 
the word ''production'' is used in connection with the 
payment of premiums. For instance, it was stipulated 
that the Tax Commission included the amounts received 
by producers "as premiums on account of the production 
of ores by said mining companies in excess of quotas 
established." 'l'he '.vord "production" has been defined 
by Webster to mean "That which is produced; a pro-
duct." Let us insert that definition in lieu of the word 
"production" in the several illustrations given by Re-
spondents: 
" (a) That the 'l'ax Commission: 
'has included as part of the gross amount re-
ceived for or the gross value of meta1liferous ores 
sold during the year 1943, the amounts received 
by said mining companies respectively from 
Metals Reserve Company as premiums on ac-
count of that which is produced, the product of 
ores by said mining companies in excess of quotas 
established* * *.' " (R. P. 28). 
"(b) .... 'premium payments shall he ma<le 
for all tha1t U'hich is produced, the product, ovpr 
quota in February and subse<lUent mont It:,;.' '' 
(R. p. 37-38). 
" (c) .... 'After quotas are estalllished, pre-
mium payments are made solely upon the basis of 
that which is produced, the product, in excess of 
allotted quofas.' " (R. p. 40). 
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" (d) .... 'Metals Reserve Company . . . . 
has agreed .... to pay to the producers of said 
metals .... the difference between the market 
price of the respective metals and the equivalent 
of seventeen cents (17c) per pound Connecticut 
Yalley basis for copper, nine and one-fourth cents 
(9I;!c) per pound New York basis for lead, and 
eleven cents (11c) per pound FJast St. Louis basis 
for zinc, as a premium for all that which is pro-
duced, the prodnct, of such metals in excess of 
production quotas to be established. . . . ' " ( R. 
p. 47). 
Indeed, no other construction of ''production'' could 
be used and accord with the over-all scheme used by 
the government to obtain additional strategic metals with 
which to prosecute the war. The very language quoted by 
Respondents earlier in their brief from the case of Vita-
graph Inc. v. American Theatre Co., 77 Utah 71, 2!)1 P. 
303, indicates the danger of picking out a portion of 
the stipulation as was clone above in an attempt to give 
a different meaning to the "premium payment" pro-
gram than is permissible in the light of all the announce-
ments and transactions surrounding the program. 'This 
court there held: 
"In construing a contract the interpretation 
must be upon the entire instrument and not mere]~· 
on disjointed or particular parts of it. 'l'he \vhole 
context is to be considered in ascertaining the in-
tention of the parties even though the immediate 
object of inquiry is the meaning of an isolated 
clause." 
Since Respondents refer to the concurring opmwn 
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of Mr .• Justice ·wolfe, we also wish to quote from that 
opinion as follows: 
"While in concept I think the whole can be 
conceived of in law as the price the sale yields, 
in final analysis I do not believe it makes much 
difference whether the part which the smelters 
pay is called a ceiling- price and the other a pre-
mium price or a subsidy. After all we should look 
through terms to realities. As holds the main 
opinion in reality the 'Amount of money .... 
actually received by the owner .... from the sale 
of all orcs or metals during the calender year .... ' 
was what those sales yielded and what they 
yielded was what was received from the mills or 
smelters or others to whom they were delivered 
.plus ·what the Metals Reserve Company paid." 
[n Promulgating the program of premium payments 
the Government was not interested in ''effort'' or '' ac-
tivity" except as it might result in more ore. Nor was 
the Government interested in ore which remained on 
the dump or at the mine. The metal was needed in war 
materials. And the only way to get more metal \Vas to 
pay more for it. As a result of being offered a tempting 
price for additional ore the mining companies produced 
more ore and made it available for the \Var effort. The 
fact that "differential pricing technique" was used at 
a great saving to the Government and thus to the tax-
payer whose responsibility it is ultimately to pay the 
hill, does not alter the fact that the "quid pro quo" for 
the payment of the premiums was the actual metals-
not mine development, expora tion, or other mining en-
c1Pavors. True, the payment of premiums to the pro-
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ducers enabled them to engage in greater activity to in-
crease their output, just as a high market price has al-
ways been an incentive for a manufacturer or producer 
to increase his output. Too, the amount paid by l\1 etals 
Reserve Company was added to the amount otherwise 
paid for the ore so that seventeen cents per pound was 
received for the copper, nine and one-fourth cents per 
pound for lead and eleven cents per pound for zinc on 
such ores in excess of the quota established-which in 
most instances was zero. 
\Ve note that on page 10 of Respondents' brief, it 
Is asserted that "in order to hold that premium pay-
ments were received on a sale," it was necessary for the 
Court to find that there had been a sale or that the 
ores were treated at a smelter or reduction works which 
received ores from independent sources. The phrase '' re-
ceived on a sale'' is nowhere used in the Statute, nor 
does the Court use such terminology. What the court 
did hold-which is in accord with the Statute-was that 
"the 'premium prices' paid to the mining companies 
arc for metals sold by them." As stated by Mr. Justiec 
~Wolfe, "lt must be kept in mind that the tax imposed 
in this case is not one on the sale of ore or metals but one 
on the priuilege of mining." The amount of the tax is <lc-
termined by the gross amount received from the ort-s, 
and the occasion or event upon which the tax accrues is 
the sale or other application of sub-paragraphi:> (a), (b), 
or (c) of Section 80-5-66, U.C.A. 1943. 
In conclusion it il:l argued that to construe premium 
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payments as a part of the proceeds received from the 
orcs would exade the provisions of the Maximum Price 
Regulations, and would put the government in the posi-
tion of engaging in blackmarketing, after having es-
tablished maximum prices "with all the surrounding safe-
guards." Of course what we have heretofore said with 
respect to Supplementary Regulation No. 4 which per-
mitted this very procedure, disposes of this argument. 
III 
ln reaching its decision, this Court did not dis-
regard the provisions of Sections 81-1-1, U.C.A. 194:1, 
defining a "Contract to Sell." This section does not pro-
vide that the amount received must be paid by the im-
mediate Buyer or that the "price" must he paid at the 
time of sale. Therefore, the fact that premium payments 
were made by 1\[etals Reserve Company and did not 
coincide with the time that the ceiling price was paid by 
the smelter does not violate the provisions of the Statute. 
Nor do we agree with the statement contained on 
page 1 ·1 of Respondents' brief to the effect that "it is 
obvious that the premium payments received during the 
calendar year 194i) were not in many instances received 
i\'(Jlll ore produced in that year, and certainly not as a 
result of Hales of ore.'' So far as the record reveals, and 
as far as Appellants arc concerned, the premium pay-
mentH reported by the several mining companies were 
received foi· and charged to the ores sold during the 
ea:cmlar year in question. vYhen the several Hespondents 
, fi:e<l their statements, required by Section 80-3-67, U. 
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C. A. 1943, they failed to report the total amount received 
for their ores, but reported only the amount received 
from the smelter or other reduction or processing plant. 
The Commission thereafter requested that each com-
pany report the premium payments received in connec-
tion with the sale of the ores already reported. This 
was apparently done. As shown by the Hccord (pp. G:~­
()4) the only difference between the amount of Occupa-
tion Tax reported and the amount assessed, is the in-
clusion of the metal premium payments. All of the fig-
ures were furnished by the producers so that they should 
be in no position now to claim that there is a variance 
from what has always been conceded to he the correct 
assessment in the event that this Court should determine 
that premium payments ·were properly a part of the 
''gross amount received for, or the gross value of, metal-
liferous ores sold." 
Again, under Argument 3, Hespondents encleaYor to 
argue that because premiums were paid "to increase 
production" there could he no relationship between such 
payments and the sale or disposal of the ores. The terms, 
"sale," "price," "premium" and "production" arc 
used indiscriminately in connection with the ''differential 
pricing technique" used by the government to "a Yoid 
profiteering and unwarranted price rises." The under-
l.ving purpose behind the program was to secure mm·c 
of those strategic metals so vital to the \Var program, 
without at the same time allowing the producer to pro-
fiteer at the expense of the government awl tho taxpayer. 
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\Vhat we have h~retofore said adequately disposes of Re-
spondents' argument No. 3. 
IV 
The statement contained under this heading is a 
mere conclusion and not supported by the facts as they 
appear from the Record. We feel no purpose would be 
served in discussing this matter further, except as it is 
answered by the other arguments contained herein. 
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As in the brief filed in support of the Petition for 
Hehearing in the Net Proceeds Tax cases, 've find coun-
sel attempting to influence the Court by the statement 
raade by l\Ir. Henderson of Metals Reserve Company in 
which he approves the Memorandum prepared by the 
mining companies and submitted to him for such ap-
proval. But as the Record shows (P. 57) "Metals He-
serve Company has made no study of the provisions of 
the Utah laws relating to taxation of mines, and is not 
in a position to express any opinion concerning state-
ments in the Memorandum on that subject." Nor is the 
commission ''bound by the facts, inference or conclu-
sions therein stated." (R p. 56). As we have heretofore 
pointed out, the Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case 
of Kennecott Copper Corporation vs. Salt Lake County 
(not yet reported) determined that the question involved 
"is essentially one of local law and therefore these de-
eisiOns (United States Smelting, Refining and l\fining 
Co. v. Haynes, 176 Pac. (2d) 622, and Combined :Metals 
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, 
Reduction Co. v. State Tax Commission, 176 P. (2d) 
614) of the supreme court of the state are controlling." 
VI 
'l'he Court did not fail to follow the rules of statu-
tory construction in reaching its decision in the instant 
cases. We recognize, as did the Court and Mr. Justice 
vVolfe, that there is "a good case" to be made for He-
spondents' position. As yet Respondents have failed to 
acknO\Yledge that "a good case" can be made for Ap-
pella~ts' position,-even though this Court has deter-
mined that the Commission was correct in making the 
assessment complained of. We recognize and approve the 
authorities cited by Respondents under their Argument 
No. 6, particularly the language of this Court in the 
case of Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 
~l7 P. (2d) 937, 126 A.L.R 1318, as follows: 
"'l'he duty of this court in construing and in-
terpreting legislative acts is to give effect to 
the intent of the legislature.'' (citing cases). 
And again: 
"~foreover, in seeking to give effect to the 
intent of the legislature the court will adopt that 
interpretation of a taxing statute which la~·s the 
tax burden uniformly on all standing in the same 
degree wtih relation to the tax adopted. In n' 
Steehler's [1}state, 195 Cal. 386, 23:3 J>. !)72. An'l 
1rill avoid an interpretation u.:hich 1could lead t:o an 
impractical, 'unfair, or· unreasonable result. ln 
re Parrott's gstate, supra." (Italics added.) 
In the light of such persuasive language we 
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are compelled to state that in reaching its decision 
in the instant matters the Court followed the pat-
ern set forth above. 
VII 
For the first time Respondents seek to differentiate 
between premiums received under ''A'' quotas and those 
received under "B" and "C" quotas. At the risk of 
being criticized by opposing counsel, we feel we should 
advise the Court that in preparing the Stipulation of 
Facts with counsel for one of the mining companies 
having "B" and "C" quotas, one of counsel for Appel-
lants asked if the company desired to include in the 
stipulation any facts which would call the court's at-
tention to such additional quotas on the theory that such 
mining company would desire to make a further argu-
ment as to such quotas. However, counsel for the mining 
company stated that in his opinion there was not suffi-
cient difference to justify calling the court's attention 
to the matter, and therefore the Stipulation was pre-
pared and adopted on the theory that all premiums fell 
into the same category. 
An.] as a matter of fact, Metals Reserve Company 
failed to make any distinction between the method of 
payment, or basis for payment in the case of the addi-
tional premiums. They were paid on the ;)asis of a 
fi.x·erl amount per pound for the metal. It only resulted 
m a greater pricing differential with respect to the 
metals involved. Instead of receiving a total of 11 cents 
per pound for zinc, the producer, having a '' B'' or '' C '' 
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quota received an additional sum per pound for such 
metal. 
If the court will refer to the affidavit of the pro-
ducer shown at p. 53 of the Record, as requested by 
Counsel for Respondents, it will observe that the com-
pany therein indicated "produced and delivered for sale 
during the month" mentioned to International Smelting 
& Refining Co., a total of 510,305 pounds of copper on 
every pound of which it received a total of 27 cents (in-
cluding ceiling price and premiums), a total of 162,863 
pounds of lead on cvc,ry pound of which it received a 
total of 12 cents (including ceiling price and premiums), 
and a total of 79, 975 pounds of zinc on every pound of 
which it received a total of 16lf2 cents (including ceiling 
price and premiums). 
CONCLUSION 
vVe respectfully submit that the Court's decision is, 
sound and accords fully with the stipulated facts and 
the record and that there is no reason for granting a 
Rehearing for the purpose of re-arguing the same points 
heretofore raised by the parties, considered by the Court, 
and determined by its opinion rendered herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRO\'ER A. GILES, 
Attorney General of Utah 
2AR E. HAYES, 
Assistant Attorney General 
ARTHUR H. NIE~LSEN, 
Special Assistant Atto.rr~e,l} Gl'nrral 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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